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$EVWUDFWThe value of microblogging services (such as Twitter) and social net-
works (such as Facebook) in disseminating and discussing important events is 
currently under serious threat from automated or human contributors employed 
to distort information. While detecting coordinated attacks by their behaviour 
(e.g. different accounts posting the same images or links, fake profiles, etc.) has 
been already explored, here we look at detecting coordination in the content 
(words, phrases, sentences). We are proposing a metric capable of capturing the 
differences between organic and coordinated posts, which is based on the esti-
mated probability of coincidentally repeating a word sequence. Our simulation 
results support our conjecture that only when the metric takes the context and the 
properties of the repeated sequence into consideration, it is capable of separating 
organic and coordinated content. We also demonstrate how those context-spe-
cific adjustments can be obtained using existing resources. 
Keywords: Language Models, Simulating Text, Online Bots And Trolls. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Recent media reports discovered massive efforts by various political groups worldwide 
to over-represent their support by employing automated or paid-human contributors 
[3]. For example, the 2016 US presidential election witnessed use of automated bots on 
both sides, with 5:1 ratio for the winner [7]. The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant 
(ISIL or ISIS) has been noted to use coordinated bots [11].  Twenty (20) percent of all 
the internet comments in China are believed to be made by paid pro-government trolls 
[12]. Russian government spends millions of dollars every year on similar activities 
[13].   
As we further elaborate in RXU³5HODWHG:RUN´VHFWLRQVHYHUDOmethods to detect 
coordination in microblogging activities have been proposed. However, they are so far 
based only RQWUROO¶s behaviour and profile characteristics. Meanwhile, several studies  
noted the occurrence of identical word sequences that can potentially serve as tell-tales 
of ongoing coordination in the content, for example  the use of the same 6 word se-
quence ³8NUDLQLDQVNLOOHGKLPRXWRIMHDORXV\´) in Twitter right after a Russian oppo-
sition leader¶V assassination [5] or  14-word sequence ³How Chris Coons budget 
works- uses tax $ 2 attend dinners and fashion shows´) to smear a US democratic sen-
ator Chris Coons [10]. While repeating those sequences indeed looks suspicious, we 
VWLOOGRQ¶WNQRZwhat are the properties (e.g. the minimum length, rarity of the words 
used, number of repetitions, etc.) of the repeated sequence to be suspicious since repe-
titions happen in organic (not-coordinated) communication as well. For example, sev-
eral tweets wrote ³(arthquake hits central Alaska´ZKHQVXFKHYHQWLQGHHGRFFXUUHG
on May 7th, 2017. Is this suspicious? While we do not claim to provide complete an-
swers to those questions here, we still make several important steps towards it by 
providing a framework for future work. Our contributions are the following: 1) we pro-
pose to model the classes of repetitions rather than individual suspicious sequences. 2) 
By using simulation and counter-examples, we demonstrate that without taking the con-
text of the post (topic) into consideration, repetitions from organic communication may 
look unjustifiably suspicious (false positives). 3) We propose the necessary context ad-
justments that allow separating organic coincidences from coordinated ones.  
The next section presents the related work, followed by the description of our frame-
ZRUN7KH³&RQFOXVLRQV«´VHFWLRQVXPmarizes our findings and possible future di-
rections.  
2 RELATED WORK 
Distinguishing automated from human accounts has been successfully tackled by sev-
eral research projects, e.g. [1][2][4][10], which offered various successful machine 
learning detection methods that are based on the behaviour of the coordinated bots 
(trolls, users, actors, etc.), such as posting the same links or same digital object or using 
fake profiles or being somehow associated with other, already detected trolling ac-
counts. However, the behaviour-only methods would not solve the problem for the fol-
lowing reason: aVWKRVHPHWKRGVEHFRPHNQRZQWKURXJKWKHLUSXEOLFDWLRQVWKHERWV¶
coordinators will simply modify their behaviour to avoid being caught. As an alterna-
tive, here we focus on detecting coordination in the content, since it is intrinsically 
inseparable from the bots¶SXUSRVHWRDPplify a certain message by artificially inflating 
the presence of certain content. A closely related problem of plagiarism detection has 
been receiving significant scrutiny resulting in a number of useful tools [9], however 
they are not known to involve quantitative estimates, but rather treat any repetitions as 
suspicious. Also, potentially relevant to the task here are the algorithms on review-spam 
detection, e.g. [6], but it is still a different task since the review spamming accounts are 
typically short lived, the reviews themselves are much longer than the microblog posts, 
and the contributors are not connected into a network. 
3 SIMULATING REPETITIONS IN TEXT 
The task we are trying to solve here is formally the following:  given a ³VXVSLFLRXV´
repeating sequence of words (n-gram), estimate the probability of occurrence of this 
sequence more than once in organic (not coordinated) set of short documents (tweets, 
posts, etc.). If this probability is very low (e.g. <0.0001), then we may claim with a high 
certainty that coordination is taking place. The suspect string is typically identified by 
a manual investigation [5] or by automatically applying a clustering algorithm [2][1]. 
Once the suspect sequence is identified, we can try to estimate the probability of gen-
erating it by applying a language model [8], e.g. using Microsoft¶V n-grams service 
(https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/services/cognitive-services/), trained  on the portion 
of WWW indexed by their search engine (Bing). For the suspicious sentence from [5] 
it gives us ഗ-16, thus accidentally repeating it in entire Twitter even once is highly 
unlikely. But how can we generalize from this to the other suspect sequences?  For 
better generalization, we suggest to model the classes of repetitions rather than specific 
sequences, so we can distinguish between types of repetitions that are suspects and 
those that do happen in organic posts. Thus, we define a repetition class C(n, p) as a 
repeated sub-sequence of n content-bearing words (n-gram), with p equal to their max-
imum probability of occurrence.  We would intuitively expect the classes with large n 
and small p to be suspect, while the repetitions in the classes with small n and large p 
to be quite common. Ignoring the stopwords is justifiable since their use is determined 
by grammatical relationships between the content-bearing words around them. Based 
RQ WKH VDPH%LQJ¶VQ-grams statistics, the repetition class for the example sequence 
above will be C(3, ഗ-5), where ഗ-5 is the probability of occurrence of the word 
killed as the most frequent out of the three context-bearing words (ukranians, killed, 
jealousy). Table 1 lists some of example sequences from real trolling attacks reported 
in the prior works and from organic communication, along with the parameters defining 
their repetition classes. 
Table 1. Examples of repeated sequences from trolling attacks and organic communication 
along with their repetition class parameters.  
 n p 
Coordinated:   
Ukrainians killed him out of jealousy 3 3.T10-5 
Ukrainians killed him out of jealousy. He stole a girlfriend from one of them. 5 3.T10-5 
How Chris Coons budget works- uses tax $ 2 attend dinners and fashion 
shows 
10 1.7.T10-4 
Organic:   
Earthquake hits central Alaska 4 1.T10-4 
16 foreigners among 39 killed in Istanbul nightclub 4 .T10-5 
Spanish prosecutors have charged Catalan cabinet  5 7.1.T10-5 
 
To estimate the probabilities of occurrences within those repetition classes, we 
run a simulation by sampling n-grams from a uniform distribution matching the class 
probabilities (p) and the lengths (n).  We generated 1000 ³tweets´ of a typical size (10 
words), and looked for repetitions using a hash table. We also obtained similar results 
by using the Zipf distribution with several sets of typical parameters, but omitting them 
here due to space limitations. We did not observe occurrences in any of the classes 
defined by those examples in any of 10,000 simulation runs. This suggests that our 
metric based on a notion of a repetition class correctly identifies the examples from 
coordinated attacks as suspicious (probability of happening in organic posts <  
1/10000). But the metric also erroneously identifies all the sequences from organic 
communication as suspect, thus underestimating the probability of repetition. In reality, 
the tweets are not random utterances as they are typically posted about certain events. 
Thus, their word distributions are strongly affected by the topic. For example, according 
to a search run over an indexed copy of Wikipedia, the probability of the word jealousy 
increases almost 200 fold when the document already has the word killed. 
Table 2. Examples of repeated sequences from trolling attacks and organic communication 
along with their repetition class parameters adjusted for the context. The last column is the 
number of simulation runs S, out of 10000, in which any repetitions in that class occurred. 
 n p S 
Coordinated:    
Ukrainians killed him out of jealousy 3 .T-3 10000 
Ukrainians killed him out of jealousy. He stole a girlfriend 
from one of them. 
5 .T-3 0 
How Chris Coons budget works- uses tax $ 2 attend dinners 
and fashion shows 
10 1.23.T-3 0 
Organic:    
Earthquake hits central Alaska 4 .T-2 3911 
16 foreigners among 39 killed in Istanbul nightclub 4 .T-2 5677 
Spanish prosecutors have charged Catalan cabinet  5 .T-2 38 
  
This observation can be quantified by introducing the probability adjustment 
factors   a(w|T) for each word w estimated as the ratio of the probability of occurrence 
within a particular topic T to the probability of occurrence in the corpus (regardless of 
a topic): 
 
 p(w) 
T)p(wT)a(w ||  , (1) 
where T LVDWRSLFGHILQHGE\DERROHDQTXHU\HJ³assassination AND russia´ 
here).  The probability of a word occurrence conditional on the topic T is estimated as 
(T)  
T)AND(wT)p(w
#
#|  , where #(q) is the number of documents in the corpus 
matching the query q. The probability of a document having the word w is estimated as 
 W 
)(wp(w) # , where W is the total number of documents in the corpus, or can be 
REWDLQHGIURP%LQJ¶VQ-grams. Alternatively, for the words closely related to the topic, 
the adjustments can be estimated empirically by running the search queries defining the 
topic T (or the related hashtags) in Twitter and counting the occurrences of those words 
in the returned tweets. For the words defining the topic itself (e.g. alaska, earthquake), 
those probabilities typically range between 0.05 and 0.1. Table 2 shows the same ex-
amples of repetitions with their classes adjusted for the context. The last column (S) 
shows the number of runs in which any repetitions within that class occurred out of all 
10,000 simulation runs. The following can be observed: 1) The repetitions classes cor-
responding to the examples from the organic posts do indeed happen, and, as a result, 
those repetitions will not be flagged as suspicious. 2) The classes of repetitions corre-
sponding to the first sentence from the coordinated attack ³Ukrainians«´also hap-
pen, and, thus this sentence alone may not serve as sufficient evidence of coordination 
contrary WRWKHLQYHVWLJDWRUV¶in [5] claim. 3) Only when combined with the sequence 
immediately following it in the posts under investigation (next line in the table), the 
entire sequence belongs to the classes of repetitions that do not happen in organic posts. 
4) The sentence about Chris Coons falls into a class of repetitions which signals a co-
ordinated attack. 
Table 3 presents additional simulation runs for various repetition classes. It is possi-
ble to observe the following: 1) Repetitions with n=3 (repeating a sequence with 3 
content bearing words) are normally not suspicious (happen in organic communication) 
unless all those words are rare (p <  ഗ-5 , which generally means not  among 10000 
most frequent words) 2) For n=4,  any repetition is suspect (does not happen in organic 
communication) unless it includes the words highly associated with the topic (p >  .01, 
which is often the case with the words defining the topic itself, e.g. earthquake and 
alaska here. 3) Repeating a sequence of 5 or more content bearing words is always 
suspicious, regardless of the magnitudes of the context adjustments. While the occur-
rence estimates we obtained using Zipf distribution are somewhat smaller, they support 
the same observations.  
Table 3. Simulation results for various repetition classes: Number of trials out of 10000 in 
which repetitions happen.  
n-gram length: n=3 n=4 n=5 n=6 n=7 
p:      
.00005 0 0 0 0 0 
.0001 3 0 0 0 0 
.0003 31 0 0 0 0 
.0005 54 0 0 0 0 
.001 126 0 0 0 0 
.003 7861 27 0 0 0 
.005 10000 47 4 0 0 
.01 10000 3911 38 0 0 
4 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
Our estimates and numeric simulations here demonstrate that it is possible to quantify 
coordination in the content, which potentially leads to exposing unwelcome activities 
in the microblogging posts (e.g. Twitter), and, thus, reducing the damage that it inflicts. 
We have proposed a metric that is based on modeling repetitions within a class rather 
than trying to model repeating individual sequences.  This study also suggests that con-
text-specific adjustments are necessary and demonstrates how they can be obtained 
based on a training corpus. We have illustrated this on several examples from past 
works and selected real microblog posts, leaving room for future more powerful ap-
proaches, such as those based on machine learning models and more formal evaluation. 
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